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INTRODUCTION 
At the outset, Appellant, Milton Bradley, adopts and incorporates all of the 
arguments set forth in the Initial Brief as though fully set forth herein. The Appellant 
maintains that the arguments set forth in his Initial Brief sufficiently address and refutes the 
arguments set forth in Appellee's Response. However, Appellant believes that Appellee 
has misconstrued and obfuscated their arguments and the real issues in this case, and 
therefore he submits this Reply Brief for the Courts consideration. 
POINT I 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY EXAMINE JUSTIN'S 
TESTIMONY PURSUANT TO RULES 402, 403 AND 404(b) 
OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Defendant incorporates all arguments set forth in his initial brief as thought fully set 
forth herein. In State v. Widdison, 28P.3d 1278(2000), it states that "trials judges must 
'scrupulously' examine the evidence before it is admitted." As set forth in the record, and 
Appellant's Initial Brief, all the trial court did was make a cursory examination of Justin's 
potential testimony and then summarily rule that it was admissible pursuant to the above 
referenced rules. The trial court did this in the context of a hearing on whether to severe 
the trial. The trial court did not "scrupulously" examine the testimony in light of the above 
referenced rules as required by Utah case law. As a result, the court erred in deciding that 
Justin's testimony was admissible. 
The State urges this Court to take the position of a Monday morning quarterback 
and examine Justin's testimony in light of the actual testimony solicited at trial. However, 
such an approach puts the proverbial cart before the horse. The examination is to be 
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made by the trial court pursuant to the above referenced rules prior to any evidence being 
presented to the jury. It is not permissible to allow that evidence to go to the jury and then 
examine it retrospectively in light of the above referenced rules. The court must examine 
the ruling of the court as it pertains to Justin's testimony prior to trial and not, as the State 
urges, Monday morning after the trial. 
Because the court did not properly exercise its function pursuant to Widdison and 
Rules 402,403 and 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the court clearly erred. This error 
was extremely harmful when, as the State urges, the testimony is considered. 
As set forth in Appellant's Initial Brief, Justin's testimony was damaging in the 
following particulars: 
The trial court did not analyze the evidence with respect to motive. It 
did not analyze the evidence with respect to opportunity. It did not analyze 
the evidence with respect to intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. The evidence was simply not analyzed-not 
to the standards required by Nelson-Waggoner. It did not really analyze the 
evidence in any particular. It simply concluded that it was admissible under 
rules 402, 403 and 404. 
The problem with the evidence, especially where it was not properly 
analyzed and admitted, and where it was improperly discussed by the State, 
and where there was no limiting instruction, is that it was highly prejudicial to 
Defendant's case. It is reasonable to believe that the jury used the evidence 
for the purpose of concluding Defendant's propensity to commit the crime 
which is legally impermissible. Justin's testimony did not add anything 
specifically different than did Amber and Skylar when they testified. The 
testimony of Amber and Skyler was very confusing and even contradictory 
at times. They could not accurately identify when the alleged incidents took 
place. They could not agree on how many times the alleged incidents took 
place. Their testimony was internally contradictory with respect to what 
happened on each occasion. Amber even came up with new allegations on 
the day of trial even though she had previously been questioned by a police 
officer and the prosecuting attorney on more than one occasion, including 
the preliminary hearing. In other words, if only the testimony of Amber and 
Skylar were before the jury, there is reason to believe that jury might have 
reached a different conclusion. Then, along comes Justin, who had no 
business testifying in this matter. His allegations were of such a heinous 
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nature that it could easily have caused the jury to overlook the 
inconsistencies and contradictions of Amber's and Skylar's testimony and to 
reach for a conviction regardless of the evidence. 
This Court should also consider the issues involved in this case. 
Sexual abuse and sodomy of a child are perhaps some of the most heinous 
crimes in our society. Most everyone consider such crimes to be abhorrent. 
By the time the testimony of Justin was added it is conceivable that the jury 
had heard enough and was ready to convict Defendant regardless of the 
problems in Amber's and Skylar's testimony. As such, the unfair prejudice 
that resulted in allowing Justin to testify clearly outweighed any probative 
value of the evidence and even if it was admissible under Rule 404 and Rule 
402, it should not have been admitted under Rule 403. 
As a result of the foregoing, this Court should set aside Defendant's 
convictions on the grounds that the trial court abused its discretion by 
allowing Justin to testify. 
Finally, the State also urges the admission of Justin's testimony based on foreign 
jurisdictions and sound public policy. Appellant submits that the same are not relevant to 
the case at hand. Utah case law is adequate to answer the question before this Court and, 
when answered, the only conclusion is that the trial court erred in its examination of the 
testimony pursuant to the appropriate rules. 
POINT II 
THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN THIS CASE IS 
FAR MORE SERIOUS THAN THE STATE URGES THIS 
COURT TO BELIEVE 
Defendant incorporates all arguments set forth in his initial brief as though fully set 
forth herein. The State would have this Court believe that the statement made by the 
prosecutor in his opening statement is some how inane, overwhelmed by other statements, 
and not prejudicial to Appellant. However, Appellant submits that a careful examination 
of the actual statement made by the prosecutor brings his conduct in line with other Utah 
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cases that have found prosecutorial misconduct for similar statements. This argument was 
amply made and analyzed in Appellant's Initial Brief, as follows: 
The State made the following statement to the Jury: 
You're going to hear what he has to say. Those 
aren't charges that you're dealing with here 
today, but those-that is testimony that you can 
and must consider in determining whether the 
abuse occurred to Amber and Skylar, what the 
abuse was and why. (R. 180; P. 108). 
It appears from the record that Defendant's counsel did not object to 
this statement, nor did he caution the jury in closing arguments on how to 
view Justin's testimony. As a result, Defendant must proceed hereunder 
using a plain error standard. 
In State v. Achambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991), this Court 
noted two exceptions to this general rule that issues not raised below will not 
be considered for the first time on appeal. The Court stated, in pertinent 
part, that: 
The first requirement for finding of plain error is 
that the error be 'plain,' i.e., from our 
examination of the record, we must be able to 
say that it should have been obvious to a trial 
court that it was committing error. . . . The 
second and somewhat interrelated requirement 
for a finding of plain error is that the error affect 
the substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that 
the error be harmful. 
The second exception to the rule prohibiting 
consideration of issues for the first time on 
appeal is a catch-all device requiring 
"exceptional" or "unusual" circumstances. It is a 
safety device to make certain that manifest 
injustice does not result from the failure to 
consider an issue on appeal. Both the Utah 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have 
often acknowledged this exception. 
Id. The Court in footnote no. 6 stated that an exception to the rule that 
issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal "has been made . . . in 
cases involving the deprivation of life or liberty." Id. 
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It should have been obvious to the trial court that this comment by the 
prosecutor was prejudicial to Defendant and it should have been clear that 
the trial court was committing plain error by not correcting the statement or 
admonishing the jury to disregard it either immediately or in a proper jury 
instruction. It is likewise clear that this comment effected the substantial 
rights of Defendant. The statement by the State was clearly designed to use 
bad acts for the purpose of showing thatDefendant had a bad character and 
that he therefore committed the crimes against Amber and Skylar-that he 
was predisposed to commit the crimes against Amber and Skylar. 
Defendant was clearly prejudiced by this statement because it gave the jury 
permission, in fact it commanded the jury, to use Justin's testimony to 
conclude that he had a bad character and was therefore guilty of the other 
crimes-the error was therefore extremely harmful. 
In State v. Martinez, 2000 WL 311191 (Utah App. 2001), this Court 
addressed this very issue, as follows: 
Although we do not decide this issue, the 
prosecutor's comment that the defendant was 
"predisposed to commit these crimes" was 
clearly improper. We note the language of the 
supreme court in Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 992 
P.2d 951: Anchoring the principle that prior crime 
evidence is not admissible to show criminal 
propensity is the more fundamental principle that 
a prosecutor may never argue or suggest to the 
finder of fact, either directly or indirectly, that a 
defendant should be convicted because of his 
criminal character or that he was guilty of the 
crime charged because he acted in accord with 
a criminal propensity shown bv such evidence. 
This is true regardless of whether that evidence 
was properly or erroneously admitted. A 
prosecutor who intentionally calls to jurors' 
attention matters that thev should not consider in 
reaching a verdict is clearly guilty of misconduct, 
particularly when a prosecutor argues prior bad 
acts or prior criminal conduct as a basis for 
convicting. 
(Emphasis added.) Even though this Court decided Martinez on other 
grounds, it set forth a standard for prosecutorial misconduct when it comes 
to arguing that a defendant "should be convicted because of his criminal 
character or that he was guilty of the crime charged because he acted in 
9 
accord with a criminal propensity shown by such evidence." Id. It is worth 
revisiting the State's statement at this point: 
You're going to hear what he has to say. Those 
aren't charges that you're dealing with here 
today, but those-that is testimony that you can 
and must consider in determining whether the 
abuse occurred to Amber and Skylar, what the 
abuse was and why. (R. 180; P. 108). 
The present case is strikingly similar to Martinez. In the 
present case, the State indicated to the jury that it would hear 
evidence of bad acts of Defendant and that it not only should, 
but it "must" consider such evidence in determining whether 
the abuse occurred to Amber and Skylar. The State 
essentially indicated to the finder of fact that it "must" use 
Justin's testimony to decide that Defendant had the criminal 
propensity to abuse Amber and Skylar and that he acted in 
accord therewith. "[A] prosecutor may never argue or 
suggest to the finder of fact, either directly or indirectly, 
that a defendant should be convicted because of his 
criminal character or that he was guilty of the crime 
charged because he acted in accord with a criminal 
propensity shown by such evidence." Id. The State did just 
this in the present case. This is reversible error under any 
standard. It should also be noted, as it was in Martinez, that 
the action of the State in this regard is considered 
prosecutorial misconduct whether the actual evidence was 
admissible or not. Finally, where the State, as in the present 
case, calls to the jurors' attention matters that the jury should 
not consider in reaching a verdict it is per se guilty of 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
As set forth above, it was plain error for the trial court to 
allow the State to not only make this statement, but to do 
nothing to mitigate its impact. It did not stop the State and 
correct the statement. It did not provide a jury instruction on 
the subject. This is clear and blatant prosecutorial misconduct 
that should have been plain to the trial court and without 
question prejudiced the substantial rights of Defendant. 
Defendant's convictions must therefore be reversed. 
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Based on the foregoing, the prosecutor's statements were clearly prejudicial to 
Appellant and constitutes prosecutorial misconduct. This Court should, therefore, reverse 
the trial court's decision. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT HAS PROPERLY ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF 
THE IMPROBABLY OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE 
CHILDREN IN ITS INITIAL BRIEF. 
Defendant incorporates all arguments set forth in his initial brief as though fully set 
forth herein. Appellant has properly addressed the issue of the inherent improbability of the 
victim's testimony in his Initial Brief and incorporates the same herein. The State appears 
to be attempting to layer burdens upon the Appellant that do not exist for this type of a 
claim. Appellant, therefore, urges the Court to address the issue of the improbability of the 
alleged victim's testimony. 
POINT IV 
THE INFORMATION DID NOT GIVE THE APPELLANT 
ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM 
Defendant incorporates all arguments set forth in his initial brief as though fully set 
forth herein. Appellant has adequately addressed this issue in his Initial Brief and relies 
thereon. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FAILURE TO ENFORCE THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
Defendant incorporates all arguments set forth in his initial brief as though fully set 
forth herein. Appellant has adequately addressed the issue of the witness who remained 
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in the court room and then later testified despite the court's invocation of the exclusionary 
rule and relies thereon. 
POINT VI 
APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICED BY THE FACT THAT THE 
ALLEGED VICTIMS WERE ALLOWED TO CONVERSE 
WITH ONE ANOTHER DURING AND PRIOR TO GIVING 
TESTIMONY IN THIS MATTER 
Defendant incorporates all arguments set forth in his initial brief as though fully set 
forth herein. Appellant has adequately addressed this issue in its Initial Brief and relies 
thereon. 
POINT VII 
APPELLANT HAS BEEN SEVERELY PREJUDICED BY 
THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL 
Defendant incorporates all arguments set forth in his initial brief as though fully 
set forth herein. Appellant has adequately addressed this issue in its Initial Brief and 
relies thereon. However, Appellant addresses an issue raised by the State in its Brief. 
The State, in its argument with respect to the analysis to Justin's testimony, 
indicates that the court admonished and instructed defense counsel to prepare a 
limiting instruction with respect to Justin's testimony. Defense counsel apparently did 
not do as instructed by the court and such failure clearly prejudiced Appellant and 
constitutes an ineffective assistance of counsel. The standard for ineffective assistance 
was set forth in Appellant's Initial Brief, as follows: 
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Defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel is 
guaranteed in both the United States Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that a defendant is guaranteed the right to have the "Assistance 
of Counsel for his defense." Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution 
provides that an accused has the right to have Counsel appear on his 
behalf. As set forth below, a defendant is entitled to more than just a 
warm body as Counsel. Counsel must meet all his duties in respect to his 
representation. In this case, as will now become apparent, Defendant's 
trial Counsel failed in numerous respects and in so doing violated 
Defendant's Constitutional rights and protections. 
When the issue of ineffective assistance is raised on direct appeal 
this Court resolves the issue as a matter of law. State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 
1177,1179 (Utah App 1994). In order to prevail on a claim on ineffective 
assistance of Counsel on direct appeal, an appellant must establish or 
satisfy both prongs of the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): (1) that his Counsel's performance "fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness;" id at 688; and (2) that 
Counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 687. See also 
State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545 (Utah 1994); State v. Frame, 723 
P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986); State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810 (Utah App. 
1994). 
"In proving the first prong of the Strickland test, the defendant must 
point to specific instances in the record where Counsel's assistance was 
inadequate. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690,104 S. Ct. at 2066. In so doing, 
the defendant must overcome "a strong presumption that Counsel's 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance." Id. at 689,104 S. Ct. at 2065. "This court will not 
second-guess trial Counsel's legitimate strategic choices, however flawed 
those choices might appear in retrospect." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 
465 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; State v. 
Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 556 (Utah App. 1991))." State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 
810 (Utah App. 1994). 
"In order to prevail on the second prong of the Strickland test, the 
defendant must show that he was prejudiced by the ineffective assistance 
of Counsel. Specifically, defendant must demonstrate "a reasonable 
probability that, but for Counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; 104 
S. Ct. at 2068; State v. Montes, 804 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah App. 1991). 
Further, in cases in which it is "easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness 
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice," we will do so without 
addressing whether Counsel's performance was professionally 
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unreasonable. Id. at 697,104 S. Ct. at 2069." State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 
810 (Utah App. 1994). 
Defense Counsel, at a minimum, have numerous responsibilities 
including a duty to investigate witnesses, facts and conduct discover. See 
State v. Crestini, 771 P.2d 1085 (Utah App. 1989); Fernandez v. Cook, 
783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990). 
A duty to investigate and research the law. See State v. Moritzky, 777 
P.2d 688 (Utah App. 1989). A duty to pursue and investigation and to be 
an effective advocate. Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870 (Utah 1993). A 
duty to be intellectually and emotionally committed to the defendant's 
case and fulfill a role that ensures that the process is fair. State v. 
Clawson, 935 P.2d 524 (Utah App. 1997). Defense counsel apparently 
did not do as instructed by the court and such failure clearly prejudiced 
Appellant and constitutes an ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Clearly, defense counsel's failure to follow the admonitions and instructions of 
the trial court on this critical issue constitutes prejudicial ineffective assistance of 
counsel. This in combination with all other failures of defense counsel prejudiced 
Appellant and denied him a fair and equitable trial. This Court should therefore reverse 
Appellant's conviction. 
POINT VIII 
THE CUMULATIVE ERRORS IN THIS CASE SEVERELY 
PREJUDICED APPELLANT AND REQUIRE A REVERSAL 
Defendant incorporates all arguments set forth in his initial brief as though fully 
set forth herein. Appellant has adequately addressed this issue in his Initial Brief and 
relies thereon. However, Appellant urges this Court to resist the State's urging that the 
errors in this case do not constitute sufficient grounds for a reversal. 
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STATEMENT OF ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Appellants respectfully request oral argument in this matter and that this Court 
publish its decision in this matter. This matter involves numerous and important 
fundamental issues that could establish precedent to guide parties and courts in dealing 
with similar issues in the future. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellants respectfully request that this Court reverse 
the ruling of the trial court and order the reversal of Appellant's conviction. 
DATED this JUdav of March, 2002. 
FEL" 
EYS FOR APPE 
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